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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

solely on the issue of river control would be improper. However, this
court found that there was evidence with regard to the Department's
attempt to control the conduct of its visitors; therefore, remand may
involve the issue of the Department's duty to make it safe for visitors to
use the river, and whether the Department could be liable for the breach of
that duty.
Sheela S. Parameswar
Domel v. City of Georgetown, 6 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the permission of a landowner was not required, and a taking
was not implicated, when a properly state licensed City wastewater
treatment facility released treated wastewater through a state owned
watercourse).
The Domel's filed suit against the City of Georgetown ("City") for a
taking by devaluation of property due to treated wastewater released into a
stream on their property by the City from a wastewater treatment plant.
The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the City. The
Domels appealed the decision.
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The
court addressed two issues on the appeal: 1) whether the stream on the
Domel's land was a watercourse, and 2) if the stream was a watercourse,
then if the City's actions constituted a taking. The court ruled that the
stream over the Domel's property was a watercourse belonging to the state,
and therefore, the City did not need the permission of the Domels for it's
actions.
Diffuse surface water belonged to the owner of the land on which it has
gathered. Water in a natural watercourse was the property of the state, and
held in trust for the public. A watercourse may be determined as a matter
of law. A watercourse must have a defined bank and beds, a current of
water, and a permanent source of supply. The court accepted the
testimony of the City's Director of Community-Owned Utilities, which
included two surveys of the Domel's property, that the three elements of a
watercourse existed in this situation. The court stated that an affidavit by
Mrs. Domel that the tributary was not a watercourse was not adequate,
admissible evidence that raised a question of fact. The court said the
affidavit set forth legal conclusions and not facts. The fact that the
Domel's did not include flooding problems in their complaint was another
factor that aided the court in determining a watercourse existed. The court
said if a natural watercourse did not exist, the increase in water flow would
have flooded the property.
Also, the court ruled that since the stream was a state owned
watercourse, and the City had the proper licensing from the state, that the
release of the treated wastewater was not a taking. In order to meet the
state's duty to conserve and develop the state's water resources, the state
had the right to transport water through watercourses for a public purpose
without permission from the riparian owners. This right was in no way
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altered by the distinction between natural or manmade water flow. The
Texas Water Code authorized a commission to issue permits for discharges
into state waters if the applicant can show feasibility of the proposed
amount of discharge from the treatment facility, and that the discharge will
not lower the quality of the stream water. In this case, the requirements
were met, thus a taking did not exist.
Tiffany Turner

Freeman v. Cherokee Water Co., 11 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
appellees on appellant's counterclaims based on the preclusion of the
claims by res judicata and statute of limitations).
In 1948, the Freemans' parents settled a condemnation proceeding with
Cherokee Water Company ("Cherokee") by conveying the title of tract of
land to them. Prior to the settlement, Cherokee sought condemnation of
the land in order to construct a reservoir to supply water to the surrounding
community and to produce electricity for the community's use. Following
the settlement, Cherokee constructed this reservoir, and later built a
residential development on the acquired property as well. As part of the
settlement with Cherokee, the Freemans' parents inserted a provision in the
deed to the land allowing them and their children to fish at the reservoir.
When their parents died, a dispute arose between the Freemans and
Cherokee as to whether these fishing rights survived the death of the
grantors. Cherokee instituted a declaratory judgment action asking the
court to construe the fishing rights provision. In response, the Freemans
entered counterclaims against Cherokee alleging fraud and violations of the
doctrine of eminent domain by Cherokee.
Cherokee filed a motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims
stating that the claims were barred as a matter of law by both the statute of
At trial, the court severed the
limitations and by res judicata.
counterclaims from the issue of the fishing rights and then granted
Cherokee's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims.
The Freemans appealed the decision of the trial court arguing that: (1)
evidence produced at trial showed that contrary to the law of eminent
domain, Cherokee used the land for private rather than public purposes; (2)
the statute of limitations should not have barred their counterclaims since
the claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence in dispute in
Cherokee's declaratory judgment action; and (3) the counterclaims involve
different matters than those decided in the 1948 condemnation suit and
therefore were not prohibited by res judicata.
The appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed the grant of
summary judgment issued by the trial court on all of the Freemans'
counterclaims. In so doing, the court held that: (1) the counterclaims did
not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that formed the basis of
Cherokee's declaratory judgment action; (2) the issues raised by the

